000			01856 a2200181 4500
008			140323b2008 xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
020			_a9781402088162
082			_a300.184
245			_aCausality and causal modelling in the social sciences _b
260			_aNew York _bSpringer _c2008
300			_axiv, 235 p. _e _f
365			_bEUR 89.95
440			_aMethodos Series, 5 _91151125
520			_aThe anti-causal prophecies of last century have been disproved. Causality is neither a a relic of a bygonea (TM) nor a another fetish of modern sciencea (TM); it still occupies a large part of the current debate in philosophy and the sciences. This investigation into causal modelling presents the rationale of causality, i.e. the notion that guides causal reasoning in causal modelling. It is argued that causal models are regimented by a rationale of variation, nor of regularity neither invariance, thus breaking down the dominant Human paradigm. The notion of variation is shown to be embedded in the scheme of reasoning behind various causal models: e.g. Rubina (TM)s model, contingency tables, and multilevel analysis. It is also shown to be latent a yet fundamental a in many philosophical accounts. Moreover, it has significant consequences for methodological issues: the warranty of the causal interpretation of causal models, the levels of causation, the characterization of mechanisms, and the interpretation of probability. This book offers a novel philosophical and methodological approach to causal reasoning in causal modelling and provides the reader with the tools to be up to date about various issues causality rises in social science. (Source: www.powells.com)
650			_aSocial sciences - Mathematical models.
942			_cBK
999			_c366620 _d366620