000			01890cam a2200193 i 4500
999			_c396381 _d396381
008			170927s2018 enk b 001 0 eng d
020			_a9781316649039
082			_a321.8 _bA5A8
100			_aAlbertus, Michael _9374065
245			_aAuthoritarianism and the elite origins of democracy
260			_aNew York _bCambridge University Press _c2018
300			_axi, 312 p.
520			_aThis book argues that - in terms of institutional design, the allocation of power and privilege, and the lived experiences of citizens - democracy often does not restart the political game after displacing authoritarianism. Democratic institutions are frequently designed by the outgoing authoritarian regime to shield incumbent elites from the rule of law and give them an unfair advantage over politics and the economy after democratization. Authoritarianism and the Elite Origins of Democracy systematically documents and analyzes the constitutional tools that outgoing authoritarian elites use to accomplish these ends, such as electoral system design, legislative appointments, federalism, legal immunities, constitutional tribunal design, and supermajority thresholds for change. The study provides wide-ranging evidence for these claims using data that spans the globe and dates from 1800 to the present. Albertus and Menaldo also conduct detailed case studies of Chile and Sweden. In doing so, they explain why some democracies successfully overhaul their elite-biased constitutions for more egalitarian social contracts. https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/authoritarianism-and-the-elite-origins-of-democracy/29C0246C5474CBC5184B2967AD4206ED#fndtn-information
650			_aDemocracy - Political aspects
650			_aElite - Social sciences
650			_aInstitutional design - Power - Privilege
700			_aMenaldo, Victor _eCo author _9374068
942			_cBK