Multiethnic coalitions in Africa: business financing of opposition election campaigns (Record no. 376632)

MARC details
000 -LEADER
fixed length control field 02198 a2200277 4500
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field 140323b2013 xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
020 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD BOOK NUMBER
International Standard Book Number 9781107605435
082 ## - DEWEY DECIMAL CLASSIFICATION NUMBER
Classification number 324.70967
Item number A7M8
100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name Arriola, Leonardo R.
9 (RLIN) 195823
245 ## - TITLE STATEMENT
Title Multiethnic coalitions in Africa: business financing of opposition election campaigns
Statement of responsibility, etc. Arriola, Leonardo R.
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC.
Date of publication, distribution, etc. 2013
Name of publisher, distributor, etc. Cambridge University Press
Place of publication, distribution, etc. Cambridge
300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION
Extent xvii, 304 p.
365 ## - TRADE PRICE
Price type code USD
Price amount 29.99
440 ## - SERIES STATEMENT/ADDED ENTRY--TITLE
Title Cambridge studies in comparative politics
9 (RLIN) 6775
504 ## - BIBLIOGRAPHY, ETC. NOTE
Bibliography, etc. note Includes bibliographical references and index.
520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC.
Summary, etc. Why are politicians able to form electoral coalitions that bridge ethnic divisions in some countries and not others? This book answers this question by presenting a theory of pecuniary coalition building in multi-ethnic countries governed through patronage. Focusing on sub-Saharan Africa, the book explains how the relative autonomy of business from state-controlled capital affects political bargaining among opposition politicians in particular. While incumbents form coalitions by using state resources to secure cross-ethnic endorsements, opposition politicians must rely on the private resources of business to do the same. This book combines cross-national analyses of African countries with in-depth case studies of Cameroon and Kenya to show that incumbents actively manipulate financial controls to prevent business from supporting their opposition. It demonstrates that opposition politicians are more likely to coalesce across ethnic cleavages once incumbents have lost their ability to blackmail the business sector through financial reprisals.
650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name entry element Social science
650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name entry element Opposition (Political science) - Africa, Sub-Saharan
650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name entry element Electoral coalitions - Africa, Sub-Saharan
650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name entry element Campaign funds - Africa, Sub-Saharan
650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name entry element Africa, Sub-Saharan - Ethnic relations - Political aspects
650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name entry element Africa, Sub-Saharan - Politics and government - 1960
650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name entry element Kenya - Politics and government
650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name entry element Cameroon - Politics and government
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA)
Koha item type Book
Holdings
Withdrawn status Lost status Source of classification or shelving scheme Damaged status Not for loan Collection code Home library Current library Shelving location Date acquired Source of acquisition Cost, normal purchase price Total Checkouts Full call number Barcode Date last seen Cost, replacement price Price effective from Koha item type
    Dewey Decimal Classification     Non-fiction Ahmedabad Ahmedabad   04/03/2013 13 1372.34   324.70967 A7M8 178628 04/03/2013 1715.43 09/04/2020 Book

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