MARC details
000 -LEADER |
fixed length control field |
02198 a2200277 4500 |
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION |
fixed length control field |
140323b2013 xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d |
020 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD BOOK NUMBER |
International Standard Book Number |
9781107605435 |
082 ## - DEWEY DECIMAL CLASSIFICATION NUMBER |
Classification number |
324.70967 |
Item number |
A7M8 |
100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
Personal name |
Arriola, Leonardo R. |
9 (RLIN) |
195823 |
245 ## - TITLE STATEMENT |
Title |
Multiethnic coalitions in Africa: business financing of opposition election campaigns |
Statement of responsibility, etc. |
Arriola, Leonardo R. |
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. |
Date of publication, distribution, etc. |
2013 |
Name of publisher, distributor, etc. |
Cambridge University Press |
Place of publication, distribution, etc. |
Cambridge |
300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION |
Extent |
xvii, 304 p. |
365 ## - TRADE PRICE |
Price type code |
USD |
Price amount |
29.99 |
440 ## - SERIES STATEMENT/ADDED ENTRY--TITLE |
Title |
Cambridge studies in comparative politics |
9 (RLIN) |
6775 |
504 ## - BIBLIOGRAPHY, ETC. NOTE |
Bibliography, etc. note |
Includes bibliographical references and index. |
520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. |
Summary, etc. |
Why are politicians able to form electoral coalitions that bridge ethnic divisions in some countries and not others? This book answers this question by presenting a theory of pecuniary coalition building in multi-ethnic countries governed through patronage. Focusing on sub-Saharan Africa, the book explains how the relative autonomy of business from state-controlled capital affects political bargaining among opposition politicians in particular. While incumbents form coalitions by using state resources to secure cross-ethnic endorsements, opposition politicians must rely on the private resources of business to do the same. This book combines cross-national analyses of African countries with in-depth case studies of Cameroon and Kenya to show that incumbents actively manipulate financial controls to prevent business from supporting their opposition. It demonstrates that opposition politicians are more likely to coalesce across ethnic cleavages once incumbents have lost their ability to blackmail the business sector through financial reprisals. |
650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
Topical term or geographic name entry element |
Social science |
650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
Topical term or geographic name entry element |
Opposition (Political science) - Africa, Sub-Saharan |
650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
Topical term or geographic name entry element |
Electoral coalitions - Africa, Sub-Saharan |
650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
Topical term or geographic name entry element |
Campaign funds - Africa, Sub-Saharan |
650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
Topical term or geographic name entry element |
Africa, Sub-Saharan - Ethnic relations - Political aspects |
650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
Topical term or geographic name entry element |
Africa, Sub-Saharan - Politics and government - 1960 |
650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
Topical term or geographic name entry element |
Kenya - Politics and government |
650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
Topical term or geographic name entry element |
Cameroon - Politics and government |
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) |
Koha item type |
Book |