An introduction to game theory

Table of Contents Preface Each chapter ends with notes. 1. Introduction 1.1. What is Game Theory? 1.1.1. An Outline of the History of Game Theory 1.1.2. John von Neumann 1.2. The Theory of Rational Choice 1.3. Coming Attractions: Interacting Decision-Makers I. GAMES WITH PERFECT INFORMATION 2. Nash Equilibrium: Theory 2.1. Strategic Games 2.2. Example: The Prisoner's Dilemma 2.3. Example: Bach or Stravinsky? 2.4. Example: Matching Pennies 2.5. Example: The Stag Hunt 2.6. Nash Equilibrium 2.6.1. John F. Nash, Jr. 2.6.2. Studying Nash Equilibrium Experimentally 2.7. Examples of Nash Equilibrium 2.7.1. Experimental Evidence on the Prisoner's Dilemma 2.7.2. Focal Points 2.8. Best Response Functions 2.9. Dominated Actions 2.10. Equilibrium in a Single Population: Symmetric Games and Symmetric Equilibria 3. Nash Equilibrium: Illustrations 3.1. Cournot's Model of Oligopoly 3.2. Bertrand's Model of Oligopoly 3.2.1. Cournot, Bertrand, and Nash: Some Historical Notes 3.3. Electoral Competition 3.4. The War of Attrition 3.5. Auctions 3.5.1. Auctions from Babylonia to eBay 3.6. Accident Law 4. Mixed Strategy Equilibrium 4.1. Introduction 4.1.1. Some Evidence on Expected Payoff Functions 4.2. Strategic Games in Which Players May Randomize 4.3. Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium 4.4. Dominated Actions 4.5. Pure Equilibria When Randomization is Allowed 4.6. Illustration: Expert Diagnosis 4.7. Equilibrium in a Single Population 4.8. Illustration: Reporting a Crime 4.8.1. Reporting a Crime: Social Psychology and Game Theory 4.9. The Formation of Players' Beliefs 4.10. Extension: Finding All Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria 4.11. Extension: Games in Which Each Player Has a Continuum of Actions 4.12. Appendix: Representing Preferences by Expected Payoffs 5. Extensive Games with Perfect Information: Theory 5.1. Extensive Games with Perfect Information 5.2. Strategies and Outcomes 5.3. Nash Equilibrium 5.4. Subgame Perfect Equilibrium 5.5. Finding Subgame Perfect Equilibria of Finite Horizon Games: Backward Induction 5.5.1. Ticktacktoe, Chess, and Related Games 6. Extensive Games With Perfect Information: Illustrations 6.1. The Ultimatum Game, the Holdup Game, and Agenda Control 6.1.1. Experiments on the Ultimatum Game 6.2. Stackelberg's Model of Duopoly 6.3. Buying Votes 6.4. A Race 7. Extensive Games With Perfect Information: Extensions and Discussion 7.1. Allowing for Simultaneous Moves 7.1.1. More Experimental Evidence on Subgame Perfect Equilibrium 7.2. Illustration: Entry into a Monopolized Industry 7.3. Illustration: Electoral Competition with Strategic Voters 7.4. Illustration: Committee Decision-Making 7.5. Illustration: Exit from a Declining Industry 7.6. Allowing for Exogenous Uncertainty 7.7. Discussion: Subgame Perfect Equilibrium and Backward Induction 7.7.1. Experimental Evidence on the Centipede Game 8. Coalitional Games and the Core 8.1. Coalitional Games 8.2. The Core 8.3. Illustration: Ownership and the Distribution of Wealth 8.4. Illustration: Exchanging Homogeneous Horses 8.5. Illustration: Exchanging Heterogeneous Houses 8.6. Illustration: Voting 8.7. Illustration: Matching 8.7.1. Matching Doctors with Hospitals 8.8. Discussion: Other Solution Concepts II. GAMES WITH IMPERFECT INFORMATION 9.1. Motivational Examples 9.2. General Definitions 9.3. Two Examples Concerning Information 9.4. Illustration: Cournot's Duopoly Game with Imperfect Information 9.5. Illustration: Providing a Public Good 9.6. Illustration: Auctions 9.6.1. Auctions of the Radio Spectrum 9.7. Illustration: Juries 9.8. Appendix: Auctions with an Arbitrary Distribution of Valuations 10. Extensive Games with Imperfect Information 10.1. Extensive Games with Imperfect Information 10.2. Strategies 10.3. Nash Equilibrium 10.4. Beliefs and Sequential Equilibrium 10.5. Signaling Games. 10.6. Illustration: Conspicuous Expenditure as a Signal of Quality 10.7. Illustration: Education as a Signal Of Ability 10.8. Illustration: Strategic Information Transmission 10.9. Illustration: Agenda Control with Imperfect Information III. VARIANTS AND EXTENSIONS 11. Strictly Competitive Games and Maxminimization 11.1. Maxminimization 11.2. Maxminimization and Nash Equilibrium 11.3. Strictly Competitive Games 11.4. Maxminimization and Nash Equilibrium in Strictly Competitive Games 11.4.1. Maxminimization: Some History 11.4.2. Empirical Tests: Experiments, Tennis, and Soccer 12. Rationalizability 12.1. Rationalizability 12.2. Iterated Elimination of Strictly Dominated Actions 12.3. Iterated Elimination of Weakly Dominated Actions 12.4. Dominance Solvability 13. Evolutionary Equilibrium 13.1. Monomorphic Pure Strategy Equilibrium 13.1.1. Evolutionary Game Theory: Some History 13.2. Mixed Strategies and Polymorphic Equilibrium 13.3. Asymmetric Contests 13.3.1. Side-blotched lizards 13.3.2. Explaining the Outcomes of Contests in Nature 13.4. Variation on a Theme: Sibling Behavior 13.5. Variation on a Theme: The Nesting Behavior of Wasps 13.6. Variation on a Theme: The Evolution of the Sex Ratio 14. Repeated Games: The Prisoner's Dilemma 14.1. The Main Idea 14.2. Preferences 14.3. Repeated Games 14.4. Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma 14.5. Infinitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma 14.6. Strategies in an Infinitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma 14.7. Some Nash Equilibria of an Infinitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma 14.8. Nash Equilibrium Payoffs of an Infinitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma 14.8.1. Experimental Evidence 14.9. Subgame Perfect Equilibria and the One-Deviation Property 14.9.1. Axelrod's Tournaments 14.10. Some Subgame Perfect Equilibria of an Infinitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma 14.10.1. Reciprocal Altruism Among Sticklebacks 14.11. Subgame Perfect Equilibrium Payoffs of an Infinitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma 14.11.1. Medieval Trade Fairs 14.12. Concluding Remarks 15. Repeated Games: General Results 15.1. Nash Equilibria of General Infinitely Repeated Games 15.2. Subgame Perfect Equilibria of General Infinitely Repeated Games 15.3. Finitely Repeated Games 15.4. Variation on a Theme: Imperfect Observability 16. Bargaining 16.1. Bargaining as an Extensive Game 16.2. Illustration: Trade in a Market 16.3. Nash's Axiomatic Model 16.4. Relation Between Strategic and Axiomatic Models 17. Appendix: Mathematics 17.1. Numbers 17.2. Sets 17.3. Functions 17.4. Profiles 17.5. Sequences 17.6. Probability 17.7. Proofs

Game-theoretic reasoning pervades economic theory and is used widely in other social and behavioral sciences. An Introduction to Game Theory, by Martin J. Osborne, presents the main principles of game theory and shows how they can be used to understand economic, social, political, and biological phenomena. The book introduces in an accessible manner the main ideas behind the theory rather than their mathematical expression. All concepts are defined precisely, and logical reasoning is used throughout. The book requires an understanding of basic mathematics but assumes no specific knowledge of economics, political science, or other social or behavioral sciences. Coverage includes the fundamental concepts of strategic games, extensive games with perfect information, and coalitional games; the more advanced subjects of Bayesian games and extensive games with imperfect information; and the topics of repeated games, bargaining theory, evolutionary equilibrium, rationalizability, and maxminimization. The book offers a wide variety of illustrations from the social and behavioral sciences and more than 280 exercises. Each topic features examples that highlight theoretical points and illustrations that demonstrate how the theory may be used. Explaining the key concepts of game theory as simply as possible while maintaining complete precision, An Introduction to Game Theory is ideal for undergraduate and introductory graduate courses in game theory. (https://global.oup.com/ushe/product/an-introduction-to-game-theory-9780195128956?cc=in&lang=en&)