Amazon cover image
Image from Amazon.com

Information, incentives and the economics of control Archibald, G. C.

By: Publication details: New York Cambridge University Press 1992Description: xv, 173 pISBN:
  • 9780521022798
Subject(s): DDC classification:
  • 330.011
Summary: "This book examines alternative methods for achieving optimality without all the apparatus of economic planning (such as information retrieval, computation of solutions, and separate implementation systems), or a vain reliance on sufficiently 'perfect' competition. All rely entirely on the self-interest of economic agents and voluntary contract. The author considers methods involving feedback iterative controls which require the prior selection of a 'criterion function', but no prior calculation of optimal quantities. The target is adjusted as the results for each step become data for the criterion function. Implementation is built in by the incentive structure, and all controls rely on consistency with the self-interest of individuals. The applicability of all the methods is shown to be independent of the form of ownership of enterprises: examples are given for industries which are wholly privately owned, wholly nationalized, mixed and labour-managed. "" Advanced monograph by a respected theorist looking at how industries can be guided to optimal performance without central planning or reliance on the market "" Archibald is a well-known figure, widely published in the journals "" This an interesting subject, made more topical by the collapse of the command economies in Eastern Europe and the search for other alternatives to pure market forces"
Tags from this library: No tags from this library for this title. Log in to add tags.
Star ratings
    Average rating: 0.0 (0 votes)

"This book examines alternative methods for achieving optimality without all the apparatus of economic planning (such as information retrieval, computation of solutions, and separate implementation systems), or a vain reliance on sufficiently 'perfect' competition. All rely entirely on the self-interest of economic agents and voluntary contract. The author considers methods involving feedback iterative controls which require the prior selection of a 'criterion function', but no prior calculation of optimal quantities. The target is adjusted as the results for each step become data for the criterion function. Implementation is built in by the incentive structure, and all controls rely on consistency with the self-interest of individuals. The applicability of all the methods is shown to be independent of the form of ownership of enterprises: examples are given for industries which are wholly privately owned, wholly nationalized, mixed and labour-managed. "" Advanced monograph by a respected theorist looking at how industries can be guided to optimal performance without central planning or reliance on the market "" Archibald is a well-known figure, widely published in the journals "" This an interesting subject, made more topical by the collapse of the command economies in Eastern Europe and the search for other alternatives to pure market forces"

There are no comments on this title.

to post a comment.

Powered by Koha