Self, no self?: perspectives from analytical, phenomenological, and Indian traditions

Is it possible for there to be subjectivity without a subject, for conscious states to be truly real while there is no real self or owner that has them? One step toward answering this question involves a further question: is consciousness in some sense reflexive or self-aware? The chapters in this collection investigate the linked issues of egological vs nonegological accounts of consciousness and the reflexivity of consciousness from the diverse perspectives of phenomenology, analytic philosophy, the Buddhist philosophical tradition, and the Indian school of Advaita Vedânta. The resulting dialogue illustrates the enhanced clarity that can be achieved by philosophizing across boundaries. Together the chapters lay out the full range of possible views concerning the nature of the self and proofs of its existence or non-existence, and the full spectrum of positions on the question of consciousness' allegedly self-intimating or self-illuminating nature. In doing so they help clarify just what is involved in giving an account of consciousness that takes subjectivity and the first-person perspective seriously.