Quiet policies and business power / Pepper D Culpepper
Material type:
TextPublication details: Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2011Description: xviii, 221 p. 23 cmISBN: - 9780521134132
- 338.6094 CUL
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Calcutta | 338.6094 CUL (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Available | IIMC-131333 |
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| 338.60724 ENG Models of industrial structure | 338.609 COL Enterprise and history : | 338.6094 CUL Quiet politics and business power : | 338.6094 CUL Quiet policies and business power / | 338.60941 COO Regional knowledge economies : | 338.60941 WAT The Branch plant economy : | 338.60947 DAL Corporate restructuring and governance in transition economics / |
Does democracy control business, or does business control democracy? This study of how companies are bought and sold in four countries France, Germany, Japan and the Netherlands explores this fundamental question. It does so by examining variation in the rules of corporate control specifically, whether hostile takeovers are allowed. Takeovers have high political stakes: they result in corporate reorganizations, layoffs and the unraveling of compromises between workers and managers. But the public rarely pays attention to issues of corporate control. As a result, political parties and legislatures are largely absent from this domain. Instead, organized managers get to make the rules, quietly drawing on their superior lobbying capacity and the deference of legislators. These tools, not campaign donations, are the true founts of managerial political influence.
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