From the knowledge argument to mental substance: resurrecting the mind
Robinson, Howard
From the knowledge argument to mental substance: resurrecting the mind - New York Cambridge University Press 2016 - xiv, 270 p.
Table of Contents
Part I - The power of the knowledge argument pp 1-144
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1 - Introducing the knowledge argument
2 - Dennett’s denial of Mary’s ignorance
3 - The abilities hypothesis and other functionalist strategies
4 - Why Frank should not have jilted Mary
5 - The phenomenal concept strategy
6 - Davidson, non-reductive physicalism and naturalism without physicalism
7 - Mysterianism, neutral monism and panpsychism
8 - Conclusion
Part II - Why physicalism entails epiphenomenalism
9 - Reductionism and the status of the special sciences
10 - Vagueness, realism, language and thought
11 - Composite objects, the special sciences, conceptualism and realism
12 - Why there are (probably) no physical individuals
13 - Dennett and the human perspective
Part III - Arguments for mental substance
14 - Some current arguments for substance dualism
15 - An argument for the existence of mental substance
16 - Plotinus,Lockeand Humeon the unity of individual substances
This book presents a strong case for substance dualism and offers a comprehensive defense of the knowledge argument, showing that materialism cannot accommodate or explain the 'hard problem' of consciousness. Bringing together the discussion of reductionism and semantic vagueness in an original and illuminating way, Howard Robinson argues that non-fundamental levels of ontology are best treated by a conceptualist account, rather than a realist one. In addition to discussing the standard versions of physicalism, he examines physicalist theories such as those of McDowell and Price, and accounts of neutral monism and panpsychism from Strawson, McGinn and Stoljar. He also explores previously unnoticed historical parallels between Frege and Aristotle, and between Hume and Plotinus. His book will be a valuable resource for scholars and advanced students of philosophy of mind, in particular those looking at consciousness, dualism, and the mind-body problem.
https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/from-the-knowledge-argument-to-mental-substance/321674C1D98D68560EF85DFFA1825085#fndtn-contents
9781107455481
Philosophy of mind
Knowledge - Theory
Materialism
Physicalism
128.2 / R6F7
From the knowledge argument to mental substance: resurrecting the mind - New York Cambridge University Press 2016 - xiv, 270 p.
Table of Contents
Part I - The power of the knowledge argument pp 1-144
Get access Export citation
1 - Introducing the knowledge argument
2 - Dennett’s denial of Mary’s ignorance
3 - The abilities hypothesis and other functionalist strategies
4 - Why Frank should not have jilted Mary
5 - The phenomenal concept strategy
6 - Davidson, non-reductive physicalism and naturalism without physicalism
7 - Mysterianism, neutral monism and panpsychism
8 - Conclusion
Part II - Why physicalism entails epiphenomenalism
9 - Reductionism and the status of the special sciences
10 - Vagueness, realism, language and thought
11 - Composite objects, the special sciences, conceptualism and realism
12 - Why there are (probably) no physical individuals
13 - Dennett and the human perspective
Part III - Arguments for mental substance
14 - Some current arguments for substance dualism
15 - An argument for the existence of mental substance
16 - Plotinus,Lockeand Humeon the unity of individual substances
This book presents a strong case for substance dualism and offers a comprehensive defense of the knowledge argument, showing that materialism cannot accommodate or explain the 'hard problem' of consciousness. Bringing together the discussion of reductionism and semantic vagueness in an original and illuminating way, Howard Robinson argues that non-fundamental levels of ontology are best treated by a conceptualist account, rather than a realist one. In addition to discussing the standard versions of physicalism, he examines physicalist theories such as those of McDowell and Price, and accounts of neutral monism and panpsychism from Strawson, McGinn and Stoljar. He also explores previously unnoticed historical parallels between Frege and Aristotle, and between Hume and Plotinus. His book will be a valuable resource for scholars and advanced students of philosophy of mind, in particular those looking at consciousness, dualism, and the mind-body problem.
https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/from-the-knowledge-argument-to-mental-substance/321674C1D98D68560EF85DFFA1825085#fndtn-contents
9781107455481
Philosophy of mind
Knowledge - Theory
Materialism
Physicalism
128.2 / R6F7