MARC details
| 000 -LEADER |
|---|
| fixed length control field |
02723cam a2200205 i 4500 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION |
|---|
| fixed length control field |
160108s2016 enk b 001 0 eng |
| 020 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD BOOK NUMBER |
|---|
| International Standard Book Number |
9781107455481 |
| 082 ## - DEWEY DECIMAL CLASSIFICATION NUMBER |
|---|
| Classification number |
128.2 |
| Item number |
R6F7 |
| 100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
|---|
| Personal name |
Robinson, Howard |
| 9 (RLIN) |
374794 |
| 245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT |
|---|
| Title |
From the knowledge argument to mental substance: resurrecting the mind |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. |
|---|
| Place of publication, distribution, etc. |
New York |
| Name of publisher, distributor, etc. |
Cambridge University Press |
| Date of publication, distribution, etc. |
2016 |
| 300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION |
|---|
| Extent |
xiv, 270 p. |
| 504 ## - BIBLIOGRAPHY, ETC. NOTE |
|---|
| Bibliography, etc. note |
Table of Contents <br/>Part I - The power of the knowledge argument pp 1-144<br/>Get access Export citation<br/><br/>1 - Introducing the knowledge argument<br/><br/>2 - Dennett’s denial of Mary’s ignorance <br/><br/>3 - The abilities hypothesis and other functionalist strategies <br/><br/>4 - Why Frank should not have jilted Mary<br/><br/>5 - The phenomenal concept strategy <br/><br/>6 - Davidson, non-reductive physicalism and naturalism without physicalism <br/><br/>7 - Mysterianism, neutral monism and panpsychism <br/><br/>8 - Conclusion<br/><br/>Part II - Why physicalism entails epiphenomenalism<br/><br/>9 - Reductionism and the status of the special sciences <br/><br/>10 - Vagueness, realism, language and thought <br/><br/>11 - Composite objects, the special sciences, conceptualism and realism <br/><br/>12 - Why there are (probably) no physical individuals <br/><br/>13 - Dennett and the human perspective <br/><br/>Part III - Arguments for mental substance<br/><br/>14 - Some current arguments for substance dualism <br/><br/>15 - An argument for the existence of mental substance <br/><br/>16 - Plotinus,Lockeand Humeon the unity of individual substances |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. |
|---|
| Summary, etc. |
This book presents a strong case for substance dualism and offers a comprehensive defense of the knowledge argument, showing that materialism cannot accommodate or explain the 'hard problem' of consciousness. Bringing together the discussion of reductionism and semantic vagueness in an original and illuminating way, Howard Robinson argues that non-fundamental levels of ontology are best treated by a conceptualist account, rather than a realist one. In addition to discussing the standard versions of physicalism, he examines physicalist theories such as those of McDowell and Price, and accounts of neutral monism and panpsychism from Strawson, McGinn and Stoljar. He also explores previously unnoticed historical parallels between Frege and Aristotle, and between Hume and Plotinus. His book will be a valuable resource for scholars and advanced students of philosophy of mind, in particular those looking at consciousness, dualism, and the mind-body problem.<br/><br/>https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/from-the-knowledge-argument-to-mental-substance/321674C1D98D68560EF85DFFA1825085#fndtn-contents<br/><br/> |
| 650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
|---|
| Topical term or geographic name entry element |
Philosophy of mind |
| 650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
|---|
| Topical term or geographic name entry element |
Knowledge - Theory |
| 650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
|---|
| Topical term or geographic name entry element |
Materialism |
| 650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
|---|
| Topical term or geographic name entry element |
Physicalism |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) |
|---|
| Koha item type |
Book |
